Asif Ezdi
A flawed constitutional package by Asif Ezdi
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Monday, March 15, 2010
Asif Ezdi
The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service.
In an award distribution ceremony of the All Pakistan Newspapers’ Society (APNS) on March 9, Zardari expressed the hope that with the finalisation of the constitutional reform package by the end of the month, the constitution would be restored to its original shape. But he also added that the Parliamentary Committee engaged in this task had to carry out its task unanimously. Zardari might still have been banking on a deadlock in the committee on the remaining contentious issues that would save him from having to part with his powers. There is one that he is absolutely loath to give up: that of appointing the army chief. A vacancy is occurring later in the year and Zardari clearly feels that by dangling an extension in service before Kayani, he can exercise leverage over the most powerful institution in the country. He would do well to recall that two earlier civilian rulers in the country, each with large parliamentary majorities, who made this calculation or miscalculation, eventually came to grief.
There are three main contentious issues before the committee on which the media has focussed attention. Besides the question of appointments to the superior judiciary, there are two others raised by the smaller provinces: provincial autonomy and the renaming of NWFP. In addition, a proposal was made to the committee that the creation of a new Seraiki province should be part of the constitutional package. But since the committee does not include any member from the Seraiki-speaking belt – which incidentally is home to nearly one eighth of the country’s population – this demand was not discussed. Some members of parliament from this region have now announced that they would not vote in favour of a constitutional package that does not provide for a new Seraiki province. These demands by the small provinces or linguistic groups are valid and must be addressed.
The procedure for judicial appointments proposed by the committee is open to many objections. First and foremost, as pointed out by some leading legal experts, it would politicise the process, both at the nomination and the approval stages. A judge would have to cross not one but two hurdles: first a vote in the judicial commission and then one in the parliamentary committee. Votes in both these bodies will be cast on the basis of political affiliation and will become public. The vote in the judicial commission could even create fissures in the superior judiciary if the three members from the Supreme Court are divided over a recommendation. Rightly or wrongly, a judge who is appointed after going through this process will always be affiliated in the public perception with a particular political party.
Strangely, the committee’s proposals completely exclude the prime minister from the process. Even more strange, the current holder of this post seems to have acquiesced in this. Besides, the proposal that the senior-most judge will become the chief justice is also objectionable because it means that the appointment to the highest judicial office will depend only on length of service, irrespective of other relevant criteria such as competence and performance.
Our present system of leaving the nomination of a judge solely in the hands of the chief justice is certainly not ideal. It leaves too much power in the hands of one man and is therefore liable to abuse. In India, a “collegium” of the five senior-most judges makes the nomination for Supreme Court judges. The government can turn down its nominee for “cogent reasons” but if the collegium persists with a recommendation, the executive has to agree. This procedure is not laid down in the constitution but has evolved as a result of rulings of the Supreme Court. Although it has been criticised for its opaqueness, it enjoys wide acceptance now in India. We should consider adopting a similar collegial system for making judicial nominations.
The question of provincial autonomy has been even more contentious in the parliamentary committee. In one short sentence of the Charter of Democracy, the leaders of PPP and PML-N, then in exile, agreed on the abolition of the concurrent list. They do not seem to have understood (or cared) that such a radical step would involve the dismantling of large parts of the federal government and would deprive the federation of legislative powers in many areas which are best regulated at the national level. In addition, the federal list is now also under attack in the committee. It is mindboggling that there was – and still is – no study of any kind, by the government or by the political parties, on what the abolition of the concurrent list and cuts to the federal list would entail for the country and the government in practical terms.
The PPP and the PML-N seem to have had second thoughts about the wisdom of abolishing the concurrent list and, according to one press report, the two parties took a “neutral” stance on the subject in the committee. PML-N has reportedly proposed a “phased withdrawal” of the concurrent list. Opposition to the complete removal of the concurrent list has come from PML-Q, which would be submitting a dissenting note on the committee’s recommendation to delete the concurrent list. The nation has been kept in the dark about these mysterious goings-on.
The apparent detachment of the PPP and the PML-N, the two largest parties in the country, from discussions on the question of provincial autonomy is appalling. Neither Gilani nor Nawaz Sharif has said anything in public on this issue of vital importance for the country’s future. The mistrust with which the smaller provinces look upon the centre arises not so much from flaws in the constitution as from repeated and prolonged periods of military rule which nullified the separation of powers between the centre and the provinces and made the bureaucracy virtually all-powerful.
The Pakistani constitution already gives more powers to the provinces than the Indian constitution gives to the states. In India, there are three lists: the union list (97 items), the state list (66) and the concurrent list (47). The residual powers are vested in the centre. In Pakistan, there are two lists. The federal list has 67 items, much fewer than India, while the concurrent list has 48. The remaining powers belong to the provinces under Article 142.
The abolition of the concurrent list is not the answer to the demand for greater provincial autonomy. It will weaken the federal government without adding anything to the powers of the provinces. Instead, the solution lies in two things. First, we need to strengthen the democratic institutions and an independent judiciary which can enforce respect for the constitutional distribution of powers between the federation and the provinces. Second, the concurrent list should be expanded by transferring to it as many items on the federal list as possible. This will strengthen the provincial governments without weakening the federation.
The 27 wise men who comprise the self-styled “Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms” were tasked to make recommendations for the implementation of the Charter of Democracy. Instead, they gave themselves the job of overhauling the constitution “in order to meet the democratic and Islamic aspirations of the people of Pakistan.” The result of their labours spread over a period of eight months is not just disappointing but also disturbing. It is a product of deals made behind closed doors to advance narrow party interests. If it is passed into law, the country will have not just a downsized but crippled federal government and legislature and a politicised judiciary.
The 1973 constitution, the precious political legacy of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, will have been mutilated beyond recognition. Our political class will have shown once more that they are incapable of seeing beyond their noses. The principal culprits before history will be Gilani for his failure to exercise national leadership as his post requires and Nawaz Sharif for his inability to look beyond the repeal of the 17th Amendment.
Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
Obama’s nuclear rebuff by Asif Ezdi
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Monday, March 08, 2010
Asif Ezdi
The writer is a former member of the Pakistan
Foreign Service.
According to a report of the Indian news agency PTI on Feb 28, the United States told Pakistan recently that there was “no way” it could get a civilian nuclear deal similar to the one it signed with India in 2008. “The United States is working closely with Pakistan to help meet its growing [energy] needs,” an unnamed senior official is reported to have said. “Nuclear power is not currently part of our discussions.” The Indo-US nuclear deal was India-specific, he said, and there was no thinking in the administration to create a template for it.
Moreover, given the past experience that the US had with Pakistan on the nuclear proliferation issue and the alleged transfer of sensitive technologies by A Q Khan, top American lawmakers and government officials had serious concerns about the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons, the official said.
This categorical rejection of civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan came after reports that Pakistan had requested the Obama administration to review his predecessor’s policy of keeping the international embargo on nuclear trade with Pakistan while lifting the ban on India. This matter was raised with White House chief of staff James Jones during his visit to Pakistan last January. Two weeks before the Indian news report, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington also said in Lahore (Feb 14) that the government had started talking with the United States for an agreement on nuclear technology. Pakistan wanted to have an agreement with the US on civilian nuclear technology like the one it had with India, the ambassador said.
At about the same time, John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, did not rule out some sort of a civil nuclear initiative for Pakistan. In an interview with an Indian daily carried on Feb 16, shortly before his visit to Pakistan, he seemed to be linking it, somewhat oddly, not with the usual concerns over proliferation or nuclear security, but with Pakistan’s taking stronger action to curb alleged terrorist activity from its soil against India.
In the US academia as well, a rethink on the question seems to have begun. In an article in The Wall Street Journal on Feb 10, Christine Fair, a South Asia expert at Georgetown University, argued in favour of a “conditions-based” nuclear deal with Pakistan. In exchange for recognition of its nuclear status and civilian assistance, she wrote, Pakistan should meet two criteria. First, it should provide access and cooperation on nuclear suppliers’ networks identified in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation. Second, Pakistan should demonstrate commitment to combating all terrorist groups on its soil, including those that act on behalf of Kashmir and Indian Muslims.
Against this background, the report that the Obama administration has now taken a decision against opening the question of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is quite a bombshell. It is another proof of the blurred vision and lopsided priorities of our political leaders of all shades that they have hardly reacted to the news.
They raised hell last January over the relatively trivial matter of intensified scrutiny of Pakistani travellers to the US and both houses of parliament reverberated with thunderous speeches denouncing the “outrage.” But on the denial of nuclear technology to Pakistan, a question which impacts profoundly on the security and economic development of not only this but also of coming generations, they have maintained a striking reticence.
Most of them travel frequently to the US on business or pleasure and understandably resent the idea of a pat-down by the no-so-friendly immigration staff at US airports, but they are unconcerned at the nuclear issue because it does not hit them in their pockets or offend their warped ideas of personal dignity. The PML-N Quaid, who rails against the evils of the 17th Amendment at every available opportunity, has not uttered a word on the question of denial of nuclear technology, whether in public or in any of his countless meetings with visiting US officials.
When Gilani was asked about the PTI report in a TV interview telecast on March 2, he said somewhat perplexingly that Pakistan had never asked for a nuclear agreement like the one between US and India (kabhi nahin kaha ke vaisa aitami muahida ho). This is news, because that is not what Gilani has himself been saying in public so far on the rare occasions that he has touched on the subject.
The official statement issued by the Prime Minister’s Office after his meeting with the ambassadors of the EU troika on Feb 13 also said that he had called upon the European Union to treat Pakistan at par with India and accord it the same access to civil nuclear technology as given to that country. If Pakistan’s policy has changed since then, Gilani needs to explain what the new policy is and why the change was made.
Needless to say, there is formidable opposition in Washington to giving nuclear technology to Pakistan. But we do have some negotiating cards which, if used skilfully, can get us what we want. As Christine Fair wrote in her article, “with success in Afghanistan elusive, Washington needs Islamabad more than ever, and vice versa.” Gilani himself said in his TV interview that if there was “imbalance” in US policies towards Pakistan and India, Pakistan’s cooperation would not be forthcoming. (Ham ne bata dia hai ke adam-tawazan hua to taawwun se qasir hain.) But mere words will not be enough.
Pakistan also has two other aces. First, it should refuse to become party to a fissile material treaty unless it is given a waiver from the NSG ban. Second, it should link its signing of the nuclear test ban treaty not only to India doing the same, as has been the policy so far, but also to Pakistan getting access to peaceful nuclear technology on the same terms. The Nuclear Security Summit being hosted by Obama next month in Washington would be a good occasion to make this announcement. It should help to place the question on the international agenda.
The main reason why the Bush administration got India a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines on nuclear cooperation is quite simple. As then secretary of state Condoleezza Rice said, the aim was to make India a great power.
This was part of the plan to harness India as a partner in the strategy to contain a resurgent China. In pursuing this objective, Washington and its partners in the NSG comprehensively broke all the non-proliferation standards that they preach so piously. The uniqueness of India, which US officials have been citing to justify this breach of their self-proclaimed norms, lies not in Delhi’s supposed adherence to the non-proliferation regime, but in the fact that India alone can play the role of a counterweight to China in Washington’s grand design.
The alleged proliferation activities of the A Q Khan network have served as a convenient pretext for those who seek to deny Pakistan access to nuclear technology for other reasons. More recently, the question of nuclear security has also been added. It is not surprising that American officials, lawmakers and analysts who are opposed to a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan make use of these excuses. What is exasperating is that so many of our own “liberal” analysts also buy these arguments. They need to read Fair’s article, who asked her readers not to forget that the Strategic Plans Division has done much to improve the safety of the country’s nuclear assets.
After getting exemption from NSG guidelines, India has now set its sights on getting acceptance as a sixth nuclear-weapons state under the NPT. Our political leadership, in contrast, is not giving due priority to the issue of access to peaceful nuclear technology and is instead devoting its full energy to evading judicial process on corruption charges. Those who want this technology denied to us are gloating.
Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
Another failed coup by Asif Ezdi
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Monday, March 01, 2010
Asif Ezdi
The writer is a former member of the Foreign Service
Under normal conditions, the appointment of Khwaja Sharif to the Supreme Court and of Saqib Nisar as chief justice of the Lahore High Court would hardly have produced a stir. Both judges possess the requisite qualifications and enjoy a well-deserved reputation for honesty and independence. But the circumstances under which the presidential announcement was made were anything but ordinary. Therefore, not surprisingly, the move was immediately seen as the first step in a wider plot to pack the superior judiciary with handpicked judges.
Zardari’s purpose in notifying the appointment was to assert absolute power to make appointments to the higher judiciary, if necessary contrary to the recommendations of the Supreme Court chief justice. If Zardari’s decision had been implemented, his second move would have been to fill the vacancies in the Lahore and Sindh High Courts, a total of about 70, mostly with PPP loyalists who could be counted upon to give judgments favourable to the party.
After these appointments, the next step – as Gilani blurted out in the National Assembly on Feb 15 and as Zardari said at a meeting with PPP parliamentarians that evening – would likely have been to ask parliament to approve the government’s decision last March on the restoration of the judges dismissed by Musharraf. With the support of the PPP’s coalition partners, this endorsement would have been denied, giving Zardari the political justification to defy the NRO verdict – or so he seems to have calculated.
This ill-conceived and half-baked scheme failed because of prompt action by the Supreme Court to suspend the presidential notification, the refusal of Saqib Nisar to take oath under it and massive rejection by the lawyers, the media and the civil society. Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry has likened the situation created by Zardari’s machinations to Musharraf’s coup of November 2007 in which the higher courts were purged of “undesirable” judges.
It is a matter of relief that a full-blown confrontation was averted by last-minute backtracking by the government in the face of overwhelming legal and public opinion. But that is hardly a reason for rejoicing. Once again, as in the crisis created last March by Zardari’s dismissal of the Punjab chief minister, it has become evident that the highest consideration that guides this government’s actions and policies is to protect Zardari from legal process. All else – the Constitution, the norms of good governance, even the preservation of the democratic order – is subordinated to this supreme objective. The destiny of 180 million Pakistanis has been put at stake to save one person who is not just tainted, but tarred from head to foot, with corruption charges.
Of all the arguments which were given by the government for refusing to accept the recommendations of the chief justice, the most preposterous was the contention that the definition of “consultation” under Article 260 – which expressly excludes judicial appointments from the general rule that the president is not bound by advice given to him – was inserted by a military dictator. This reasoning ignores the basic principle that the courts do not have the power to selectively discard some constitutional provisions simply because their author was a discredited military dictator.
The government’s attempt to make appointments to the judiciary in disregard of the constitutional provisions shows how much it is out of touch with the new political realities and public opinion. Vital national decisions continue to be taken not by the duly constituted government but by Zardari and a small coterie of his advisers. Our “sovereign” parliament has little say. Its main function is to serve as a rubberstamp for the presidency, much as it did under Musharraf.
This is not, of course, the first time that a tiny cabal in the Presidency took the country to the edge of the precipice only to save their jobs and that of their boss. They did it in March last year on the question of the restoration of the judges. They did it again in October when they pushed the NRO under the most dubious circumstances through the National Assembly’s Law Committee, only to back down later under pressure from an outraged public opinion.
Once again, Gilani, who is the head of government, was reduced to the position of Zardari’s stooge. This is even worse than under Musharraf. Shaukat Aziz was a sidekick of his boss. Gilani acts as a minion of his. As Gilani himself told reporters on Feb 14, it was his job to “ultimately” give advice on the appointment of judges. But he left the matter to others (Babar Awan and company), saying it was “basically” the work of experts from the ministry of law and justice. Against his better judgment, Gilani advised Zardari to overrule the recommendations of the chief justice. Therefore, he bears full responsibility for the resulting mess.
A prime minister is supposed to exercise his own judgment in taking decisions, and then take responsibility for them. He cannot pass the buck to those who are subordinate to him. It was not, of course, the first time that Gilani “disagreed with himself.” He did it last March in the self-created crisis over the dismissal of the Punjab government. In that imbroglio, Gilani formally advised Zardari to declare emergency in the province and then let it be known through the press that he had actually been against taking this step.
Again, on the question of obtaining parliamentary approval for the NRO, Gilani was bypassed. He later tried to explain lamely – and falsely – that the government had sent the ordinance to parliament for approval only because of the Supreme Court’s orders. Actually, as everyone knows, the orders had come from Zardari.
Gilani’s inability or unwillingness to perform the role of prime minister means that what should be the most vital organ of state in a parliamentary democracy is not functioning according to the Constitution. It is no wonder that foreign governments do not take him seriously. The most glaring example is the insistence of the European Union that our side at the Pakistan-EU Summit next April must be led by Zardari, not Gilani, as our government has decided.
The country was barely able to weather three major confrontations in one year: over the restoration of the judiciary, the annulment of the NRO and appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts. But the mother of all crises – over the enforcement of the NRO judgment – will be coming soon. The government, under Zardari’s instructions, has been stalling in implementing the Supreme Court’s decision on reopening the case before Swiss courts. Gilani’s reported offer to withdraw accountability cases against Nawaz Sharif if he does not press the government on the Swiss case confirms what the people have known all along – that our political class treats taxpayers’ money as spoils to be divided between themselves.
Zardari’s unsuccessful attempt last March to eliminate his political rivals by toppling the Punjab government and disqualifying the Sharif brothers was his first failed coup. This month’s aborted move to cripple the country’s newly independent judiciary and pack it with politically connected and subservient judges was his second. Between the first and second coups, there was also a failed mini-coup when the government rammed the NRO through a parliamentary committee in October, but failed to have it passed by parliament.
Now another crisis looms as Zardari defies the Supreme Court’s judgment on the NRO. We need a strong and steady pair of hands to steer it through the coming storm. Gilani has to decide whether he wants to serve the country or Zardari. It is to be hoped that he will choose the country. But if Gilani does not rise to the occasion, others will step in. This happened in March last year. It was not Gilani but Kayani who defused the crisis then. If Gilani fails again, the judgment of history will be very harsh to him.
Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
India’s belated turnaround by Asif Ezdi
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Monday, February 22, 2010
Asif Ezdi
The writer is a former member of the Pakistan
Foreign Service.
The Indian proposal to Pakistan for open-ended talks at the level of foreign secretaries to discuss all outstanding issues is a belated admission by New Delhi that its refusal to engage in a dialogue with Pakistan more than a year after Mumbai has been hurting Indian interests more than it is harming Pakistan’s. Reflecting this recognition, Indian officials have uncharacteristically been quite civilised in their language and tone towards Pakistan recently, and especially since the proposal was made.
India has so far shown reluctance to agree to the Pakistani proposal that the old format of “composite dialogue” should be revived, but the last word has not yet been said. When the two foreign secretaries get together later this month, the major task before them will be to prepare the ground for a meeting between their prime ministers at the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in the Bhutanese capital of Thimphu on April 26 and 27. If things go according to plan, a formal resumption of bilateral dialogue will be announced at this summit.
Manmohan Singh’s willingness, if not keenness, to start the dialogue process with Pakistan was evident also at the Sharm el-Shaikh Summit last July, at which he agreed to de-link the issue of talks from that of terrorism. But Manmohan Singh was made to backtrack by the unexpectedly strong backlash which came not only from the opposition BJP but also from within his own party and the Indian foreign policy and security establishments.
More than half a year since then, the Manmohan Singh government has now launched another diplomatic initiative to resume dialogue with Pakistan. He has a difficult balancing act to perform. He has to convince Pakistan that the talks will be not only about terrorism but will cover other issues of interest to it, while assuring domestic public opinion that the focus will be on terrorism and that progress on other issues would be linked to action by Pakistan on punishing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack.
According to Prime Minister Gilani, India has been forced to the negotiating table because of world pressure. This is a mistaken view. True, Washington has been urging Delhi to relieve pressure on Pakistan’s eastern borders to enable the Pakistani army to concentrate more on the fight against terrorists on its western borders. But Delhi’s readiness to resume talks, despite its unhappiness over what it sees as lack of action by Pakistan against terrorists who seek to target India, is founded in India’s own calculation that its wider interests and goals are better served by restarting a dialogue with Pakistan. There are several reasons for this.
First, India recognises that its “coercive diplomacy” towards Pakistan has failed. In 2004, when India last resumed talks after a terrorism-related suspension, it extracted a price: a commitment from Musharraf that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. This time, India initially demanded a bigger price: a dismantling of the “infrastructure of terrorism.” Since then, India has been scaling down its demand. On Feb 3 Foreign Minister S M Krishna said that Pakistan’s readiness to accept Ajmal Kasab’s confessional statement as evidence to prosecute the planners of Mumbai was a constructive signal and that India “should be quite satisfied with Pakistan taking a few steps to investigate the Mumbai attacks.” This is a far cry from the demand made in 2008 by M K Narayanan, then India’s national security adviser, for “destroying” the ISI.
Second, India has been rattled by the recent US readiness to take the Taliban on board in an eventual Afghanistan settlement and by Karzai’s offer to hold talks with their top leaders. India was virtually alone in opposing the endorsement given by the London Conference to the plan to win over the Taliban. Besides, there is the emerging recognition by the international community that Pakistani concerns about Indian domination of Afghanistan are not without foundation and will have to be taken into account.
Delhi’s fear is that it would be marginalised if a peace process which eventually gives the Taliban a share of the power were to take hold. One of India’s great strategic minds has now even proposed that Manmohan Singh should invite Karzai and Zardari for a trilateral summit on Afghanistan.
Third, India is keen to enter into talks with the “moderate” faction of the APHC on the grant of autonomy to Kashmir. But since Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, who heads this faction, lacks broad support within Kashmir for such a deal, he is reluctant to take the political risk of negotiating with Delhi without at least the tacit understanding of Pakistan that Musharraf was prepared to give him.
India would also like autonomy talks with “moderate” Kashmiri leaders to proceed in parallel with backchannel talks with Pakistan on a “non-territorial” settlement of Kashmir which were initiated under Musharraf. The deal he was negotiating with Manmohan Singh would have sanctified the division of Kashmir along the Line of Control in return for self-governance in different parts of the divided state. Manmohan Singh sought to revive these talks soon after Musharraf’s ouster from power. This was the “good news” Zardari promised to the nation in his first press conference after taking over the presidency.
Left to himself, Zardari would have followed in Musharraf’s footsteps. But after the Kerry-Lugar fiasco and the NRO judgement, he is not in a position to bypass the foreign ministry and the military establishment in policy-making on issues of national security. In a welcome departure from past practice, the government’s response to the Indian offer of talks has been prepared after careful deliberation involving all the institutions concerned.
The position taken by Foreign Minister Qureshi on Musharraf’s backchannel deal with Manmohan Singh on Kashmir is particularly welcome. On Feb 7 he rejected repeated claims made by his predecessor Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri that the Kashmir dispute had been close to settlement through backchannel diplomacy under the Musharraf regime. Qureshi said that if the previous government had been negotiating with India on any such proposal, it was a “secret” between some “selected individuals.” It had never been debated in the government and there was no record of it in the foreign ministry. If Qureshi’s statement means that the government has now decided to repudiate the deal that Musharraf was negotiating, it is probably the most sensible foreign policy decision that this government has taken.
Qureshi also said that though backchannel diplomacy was important, disputes between nations were always resolved through formal talks. Since this government has also named former foreign secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan as its envoy for talks with India, it owes an explanation to the nation on where it stands on the question of backchannel diplomacy. Was our emissary’s meeting with S K Lambah last November in Bangkok a “secret” between “selected individuals” like those under the Musharraf regime, or was it a part of formal talks? And if it was wrong for Musharraf to negotiate through the backchannel, why is it right for this government to do the same?
Qureshi was right, though, in cautioning that a Kashmir settlement was unlikely during the tenure of the present government. That is not a tragedy because a settlement in the present international environment would be based on the status quo, which is what the Kashmiri people have been fighting against all these years. They have suffered a lot but they can wait because time is on their side.
After a long period of militancy, the movement for azadi has now entered a new phase. It has become a deeply rooted and broad-based political movement that cannot be suppressed indefinitely through brute force. Our policy should aim at generating international pressure on India to allow this movement to operate at the political level, while promoting links between the people in the two parts of the state through increased trade and travel across the Line of Control. The rest will follow.
Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
‘Reforming’ the constitution’ by Asif Ezdi
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Part II
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Asif Ezdi
The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service.
More and more countries, even some in the English-speaking part of the world with a strong attachment to British parliamentary traditions, have been switching to proportional representation (PR). In Pakistan as well, the shortcomings of the simple plurality system, have been known and the simple solution would be to adopt the PR system. But no serious attention has been given to this matter. This is because the larger parties, which benefit from the continuation of the present unjust system, are represented in the legislatures very much in excess of their real electoral strength. They have been the main obstacle to a reform of the system.
The PR system was seriously considered only once – by the wrong man and for the wrong reasons. Elections announced by Zia for November 1979, later cancelled, were to be on the PR system, in the expectation that under this system the PPP would not be able to secure a majority.
The second main flaw in the present electoral system is that nearly one-third of the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies consisting of the reserved seats are indirectly elected by a very small electoral body. This degrades the process to one of selection by the party bosses who control the allotment of party tickets. Therefore, there is a very heavy representation of relatives and friends of the party leader and their relatives and friends. Those who are indirectly elected owe their seats entirely to the leader and repay their debt by total and unquestioning loyalty to him in the hope that their services would be recognised and they would be rewarded by being given the party ticket in future elections as well.
All the flaws of indirect elections by a small and closed electoral body are also in evidence in the Senate. Besides the suspected role of big money, there is the added problem that (a) the tenure of the Senators exceeds that of their electors; and (b) since the elections take place every three years, nearly half the membership of the Senate at any given time is composed of members who were elected by MPAs who have themselves either completed their tenure or are about to. These Senators can therefore hardly claim to represent any constituency.
Thus, one-half of the present Senate consists of those who were elected in 2006 by the provincial assemblies, which were themselves elected in 2002 and have served their full term. These Senators, who will retire in 2012, still have two more years to go. Similarly, MPAs elected in February 2008 will elect one-half of the Senate membership in March 2012, who would then serve till 2018, ten years after their electors had themselves been elected and five years after they will have ended their term.
Such a body can hardly claim any true representative character. The system of indirect election therefore ought to be scrapped. In its place, a system of PR should be introduced.
The question of the tenure of the two Houses of Parliament also needs to be reviewed. A six-year term for Senators is much too long for an indirectly elected body. There would be some justification for it only if a system of staggered direct elections is adopted. For the National Assembly, a four-year term has often been proposed and there is a lot to be said in its favour. There would be tow main advantages. First, it would make our governments a little more responsive to public opinion and the MNAs a little more heedful of the views of their constituents. Secondly, there would be less pressure for midterm elections and a greater readiness to allow the assemblies to serve their full terms.
To strengthen the parliamentary system, the bare minimum would be to restore to the prime minister the powers of appointment of the Governors, top posts in the military and the judiciary, which the 17th Amendment transferred to the President. In addition, the other changes made by Zia in Articles 90 to 96, which deal with the election of the Prime Minister and his removal through a vote of no confidence, should also be scrapped and the original language of these Articles should be restored. One of the leftovers of the Zia regime is that the president still enjoys the power to require the prime minister to obtain a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. In a fluid political situation, this would enable the president to destabilise a sitting government and replace it with one of his choice. This should not be allowed. Besides, the original Article 96, which provided for a “constructive” vote of no confidence, should be restored. This means that a vote of no confidence would only be passed if a successor is named in the same resolution.
The principle of separation of powers or of “trichotomy” between the three main organs of state has been much talked about recently but the most brazen violation of this principle – the ordinance-making power of the Government – seems to be tolerated. The frequency with which our governments have been issuing ordinances amounts to a usurpation of legislative powers by the executive. What should be an exception has become the rule. This has to be stopped. Law-making should be the exclusive domain of the legislature, as it is in democratically governed countries and the ordinance-making power of the government should be limited to cases when the Assembly stands dissolved.
Provincial autonomy is a goal on which all parties agree. The challenge is to give more powers to the provinces without dismantling the federal government and without taking away from the parliament the power to legislate on matters which can best be dealt with at the federal level, such as the fight against corruption or the control of drugs. This would best be achieved not by scrapping the Concurrent List but by transferring those subjects from the Federal List to the Concurrent List on which the provinces want to have a greater say.
A system of checks and balances is the heart of a democratic system. If we are to transfer all executive powers to the prime minister, as we should, we must also provide a safety valve for emergencies. Article 234 already caters for such contingencies in a province. An appropriate mechanism is needed also at the federal level. Twice in our recent history, we had all-powerful prime ministers who enjoyed large majorities in the Parliament. They were both toppled by military coups d’état (1977 and 1999), which in turn wreaked havoc in the country.
We need to draw a lesson from these two instances and provide for an appropriate safety valve within the Constitution to cope with political emergencies. The president’s power to dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion in certain well-defined situations should therefore be retained. But there should be a check on this power. Article 58 (2) (b) presently provides for a judicial review. This is wrong because it is not the function of the judiciary to adjudicate on a matter which is essentially political. Instead we need a political check, such as a requirement that the president who dissolves a National Assembly would lose office unless he obtains a vote of confidence from the newly elected Assembly within a certain period.
Clearly, a reform of the Constitution is required. But this is too important a matter to be left to a parliamentary committee which was formed only to implement the Charter of Democracy. A wider debate involving parliament, the political parties, the media and the civil society is needed.
Part I of this article appeared on Feb 15.
(Concluded)
Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
‘Reforming’ the constitution by Asif Ezdi
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Monday, February 15, 2010
Asif Ezdi
The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service.
The self-styled and inappropriately named “Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms” has been trying to keep itself in the news lately. It was formed in June last year and given the job of making recommendations to implement the Charter of Democracy. It has been in existence for eight months but is still far from completing its task. Its chairman, Raza Rabbani, recently told a newspaper that although no deadline could be given, efforts would be made to submit the committee’s recommendations to the government by mid-March.
Unlike Rabbani, who was careful not to give a deadline, Gilani has declared that the committee would finalise its task before Zardari’s speech to the joint sitting of parliament, which is due in March. As there are still many important, unresolved and contentious issues (provincial autonomy, renaming of NWFP and the appointment of judges), it is safe to say that the optimism expressed by the government is not based on an emerging convergence of views but is merely a ploy to relieve pressure on Zardari.
Last year, when Zardari fell into serious difficulties for the first time, he signalled that a constitutional package would be ready by the end of December. To convince doubters, he even agreed to transfer the chairmanship of the National Command Authority to the prime minister. But the crucial test is whether Zardari is prepared to give up the power to appoint the army chief. That is the most valuable card he holds in the present state of political uncertainty.
Since his speech at Naudero, Zardari and his acolytes have been railing against the judiciary and the military – holders of “tenure posts.” He lost the ability to influence the judiciary last March when the constitutional chief justice was restored to his office. Giving up the power to make appointments to the post of army chief would deprive Zardari of control over the most powerful institution in the country and make him look very much like a lame duck, even if he remains the PPP leader.
If Zardari had been more secure in the presidency, he might conceivably have given up the power to appoint the army chief. But not in the present situation, when he feels threatened from all sides. Those who have been waiting for the 17th Amendment to go are therefore not likely to get their wish before Zardari’s exit.
That means also that the committee will remain in business for the foreseeable future. It was given a limited mandate by parliament, confined to making recommendations for the implementation of the Charter of Democracy. But it has taken upon itself the highly ambitious task of reforming the Constitution, a job which parliament never assigned to it. Under the rules of procedure adopted by the committee, it gave itself the power to propose constitutional amendments of all kinds “in order to meet the democratic and Islamic aspirations of the people of Pakistan.”
Gilani has another reading of the committee’s remit. He has been saying that its job is to restore the 1973 Constitution to its original form. Even if we take it that Gilani has been using these words in a loose sense – which is what he usually does – and that what he really means is that the Constitution should be brought back into the form it had before Zia’s coup, it would entail a whole lot of amendments.
To name only a few of them, it would mean that the electoral college for election of the president would consist of only the two houses of the federal parliament; that the president’s power to address a joint session of parliament would be repealed; that the Federal Shariat Court would be abolished; that the term of office of the senators would be reduced from six to four years; and that the “Islamic” qualifications for elected office introduced by Zia would be abolished.
Another example of the highly selective manner in which the committee has been “reviewing” the Constitution is that it has not addressed the question of presidential immunity under Article 248. Ahsan Iqbal, who represents the PML-N on the committee, disclosed in a TV interview on Oct 1 last year that his party had proposed the removal of this protection for the president and the governors, which was a legacy of the colonial times and was against the precepts of Islam. After the Supreme Court’s judgment on the NRO, this should have been a question of the highest priority, but we have no news what became of the proposal. The PML-N has also not pressed it. Would Ahsan Iqbal please explain?
The basic problem of the committee is that, in carrying out the much vaunted “review” of the Constitution, its members are guided by no higher purpose than to promote the narrow interests of the political parties to which they belong. The PPP wants to save Zardari’s rule and the PML-N would like the third-term ban for the prime minister to go. Other parties have their own priorities. And they all agree that whatever the performance of the National Assembly, they should be left free to enjoy the perks of office without the sword of Damocles, dissolution, hanging over their heads.
The Constitution no doubt needs to be reformed to rid it of the accretion of deformities and excrescences under the heavy battering it received at the hands of Zia and Musharraf. The amendments made by them were mainly aimed at strengthening the powers of the president at the expense of the prime minister and of parliament. Besides, Zia also attempted to legitimise his rule by “Islamising” the Constitution through such measures as the creation of the Federal Shariat Court, separate electorates and “Islamic” qualifications for elected office. All these amendments, including those dating from Zia’s time, and not just the 17th Amendment, need to be reviewed.
In addition, 37 years after the Constitution was adopted, it would be perfectly in order to carry out an overall review to see what changes are required to improve the functioning of the political system. It will be found that there is plenty of work to do. But it must be carried out not through deal-making behind closed doors, as the committee seems to prefer, but through a transparent process involving public debate and with the aim of accomplishing agreed goals.
A broad consensus already exists on the following:
1. Making the elected institutions more representative and more responsive to public opinion
2. Strengthening the Parliamentary system
3. Separation of powers
4. Provincial autonomy
5. Checks and balances
The National and Provincial Assemblies are presently elected partly, with about two-thirds of the membership directly under the first-past-the-post system (or simple plurality), and the remaining one-third to represent women and the minorities elected indirectly by the directly elected members. The entire membership of the Senate is elected indirectly, mainly by the members of the Provincial Assemblies.
This method is flawed for two reasons. First, because of the system of simple plurality, the larger political parties are over-represented in parliament, while the smaller parties are under-represented and sometimes go unrepresented. Because of the system of indirect election for the reserved seats, this imbalance is reflected also in these seats. As a result, large sections of the electorate who have voted for the smaller parties go unrepresented. Besides, since only those who are in a position to spend large amounts of money can hope to win such elections, members of a small, predatory and corrupt ruling class dominate our political life.
The system of simple plurality works best where there are only two or three large political parties, as in the United States and Britain. Even in Britain, where a three-party system has grown in recent decades, the simple plurality system is being increasingly questioned. For election to the European Parliament, Britain has already adopted proportional representation. In Pakistan, where there are half-a-dozen major parties and nearly another half-dozen smaller parties, the simple plurality system has produced very skewed results. This is especially true for Balochistan, where there is a multiplicity of political parties.
(To be concluded)
Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
Not through catchy slogans by ASIF EZDI
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ASIF EZDI
The disappointment of top Pakistani cricketers at their exclusion from IPL and the anger of their fans were natural and understandable. But after having expressed his annoyance, Shahid Afridi set the right tone when he told an Indian news agency on January 26 that he was prepared to forgive those who tried to insult Pakistani cricketers but was not interested any longer in taking part in IPL. The reaction of some of our politicians has not been so dignified.
True, the behaviour of IPL was petty, mean and spiteful. True also, the Indian government was in on the plot. But for highly placed Pakistani officials and politicians to speak of national humiliation is ridiculous.
Pakistan’s “honour” is not so easily compromised. In any event, whether the country’s good name is besmirched depends on how ‘we’ react, not on some calculating business entrepreneurs from India, however loutish their conduct.
It is difficult to see what the organisers of the IPL (and the Indian government) achieved, except the perverse pleasure of seeing Pakistani cricketers, fans – and quite unnecessarily – some political personalities seethe with anger. The hosts now seem to have realised that they did more harm to themselves than they did to Pakistan.
First, it was some retired foreign secretaries of India who criticised the action. Later, Indian Home Minister Chidambaram tried, unconvincingly, to distance the Indian government from the IPL decision and criticised the organisers for doing a disservice to cricket. Now, their sports minister has also expressed his “sympathies” with the “snubbed” Pakistani players.
Our sports minister took up the matter with his Indian counterpart and has announced that the Pakistan Cricket Board would be raising it with the International Cricket Council. Besides, the visit of a parliamentary delegation to India to participate in the 50th anniversary of India’s Election Commission has been cancelled by the government, evidently in an effort to pacify domestic public opinion outraged by the gratuitous slight to our cricketers.
The leader of the opposition in the assembly has taken a more robust stand. Nisar demanded a boycott of all sports events with India, anywhere in the world, and a complete ban on the screening of Indian films in Pakistan. He also announced that, in protest, no member of his party would be a part of any delegation to India unless it changed its attitude.
Nisar’s call for a change in India’s “attitude” is certainly not likely to be heeded any time soon in Delhi. This mindset is not something that began with the IPL’s rebuff to Pakistani cricketers last month. And a better guide to the Indian thinking is the pattern of deployment of its armed forces and its military doctrines, as well as the Indian army chief’s recent statement about their capacity to wage a conventional war against Pakistan under a nuclear “overhang.”
Promote Urdu – and reform it by Asif Ezdi
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Monday, February 08, 2010
Asif Ezdi
In November, the Karachi Arts Council hosted the “Second Alami Urdu Conference” (Urdu International Conference). The event attracted an impressive constellation of literati from within Pakistan, besides a few from abroad, and produced many learned discourses on Urdu literature, mostly its past. But whatever the meeting might have done for Urdu literature, it is not likely to be remembered for any contribution it made to the promotion of the language. Judging from the programme and the papers read, that does not seem to have been on the minds of either the organisers or the participants.
Since Independence, Urdu has no doubt made great strides in its geographical spread and popularity. It is the mother tongue of less than a tenth of the population but is understood and spoken in all corners of the country. It is accepted because it does not seek to displace, or even compete with, the local mother tongue and because it has been naturalised in Pakistan. It is spoken in different regional idioms and accents, each of which is as authentic as any in its original habitat across the border. This Pakistani Urdu is a national treasure of inestimable value, facilitating communication and cementing human bonds between people of different ethnicities living in different parts of the country and proud of their own languages and local traditions.
All this has taken place not because of any official patronage but in spite of step-motherly treatment from state. No government has been seriously interested in implementing Article 251 of the Constitution, under which arrangements were to be made by 1988 for the use of Urdu for official and other purposes. Government policies have actually had the effect of discouraging Urdu. English has been retained as it helps the bureaucracy to keep its grip on power and the ruling class to hold on to their position and privileges. Those who aspire to acceptance by the ruling elite also see English as a passport for entry into the club.
To 18th-century writer Samuel Johnson is attributed the dictum that languages are the pedigree of nations. In his days, this was probably largely true for a nation’s ethnic as well as its cultural lineage. Because of mass movements across national frontiers since then, language and ethnicity cannot be equated today. But Johnson’s aphorism remains true as far as the correlation between language and culture is concerned.
Language is the main vehicle for cultural expression and nations which take pride in their culture also take pride in their language. The way we treat Urdu is symptomatic of a bigger problem. It reflects also the way we – or at least our ruling elite – look at our own cultural pedigree. Nothing illustrates this attitude better than the fact that, instead of speaking in the national language, Zardari chose English when he took the oath of office as president and in both his speeches to parliament, although his delivery was halting and one could see how he was struggling to read from the prepared text.
Urdu is made up of a rich mix from three great linguistic streams: Sanskritic, Persian and Arabic. Words and constructions derived from all of these have been absorbed in a natural process spread over centuries. From time to time, proposals are made for the adoption of the roman script. This would be a folly. It will not only deprive future generations of access to much of our cultural heritage, but it will also cut off Urdu from two of three major sources of enrichment.
That is not to say that the Urdu script is perfect. A good alphabet is one in which each symbol or combination of symbols represents one and only one sound. If this criterion is to be met, a reform of the Urdu alphabet would be required in five areas:
First, the Urdu alphabet does not make adequate distinctions between some of the vowel sounds. This is because the Arabic script, on which Urdu writing is based, has eight vowels, while Urdu has ten. The two additional sounds are the following. (1) The vowel pronounced as ay in English, which is written in Urdu in the same way as ee. Thus the same Urdu word is pronounced as sher (lion) as well as shir (milk). (2) The vowel pronounced as “oh” in English, which is written in Urdu in the same way as oo. The same word can therefore be pronounced both as bo (the verb “sow”) and bu (“smell”). In Pashto, the first of these two problems has been solved by the introduction of a new diacritic to be placed below the letter ye and consisting of two vertical dots. This mark stands for the English ay. The same solution could be adopted in Urdu. Similarly, a new diacritic could be introduced to distinguish the sound o from oo.
Second, there are two vowel sounds from English which have now become a part of Urdu and will have to be accommodated in the script. These are (1) the English aw, as in the word form, which is written in Urdu exactly as the word “farm”; and (2) the English e as in set, which is written in Urdu exactly as sat. Sometimes, as in the Urdu word for pencil, the vowel e is not written, though it is pronounced. To overcome this problem, new diacritics will have to be devised for aw and e. In Hindi, a new diacritic has already been created for aw.
Third, since the letter vao and ye can be used both as vowels and consonants, a new diacritic could be introduced to signify the consonant form in order to distinguish it from the use of these letters as vowels. The place name Swat would be pronounced as sawat if vao is a consonant and as soat if vao is a vowel. The place name Lyari would be pronounced as liari if the letter ye is a vowel and as layari if it is a consonant.
Fourth, when two consonants come together at the beginning of a word of foreign origin without an intervening vowel, Urdu sometimes introduces a vowel between the consonants (e.g., English “glass” becomes gilas in Urdu) and sometimes it does not (e.g. English “school” is skul, not sakul or iskul.) For some Hindi words as well, the additional vowel is inserted in some cases, but not in all. Hindi brahman could either become barahman or remain brahman in Urdu. But Hindi kripan could become Urdu kirpan. A diacritic therefore needs to be created for cases where two consonants are pronounced together without the insertion of a vowel between them.
Fifth, to distinguish the use of the letter noon as a consonant from its use for nasalisation (noon ghunnan) in the middle of a word, a new diacritic could be introduced for the latter. This is important, because a word can have different meanings depending on whether the letter noon is being used as a consonant or for nasalisation. An example is the word hans. If noon in the middle is a consonant, the word means “swan” and if it is used for nasalisation, it means “laugh.”
In all, seven new diacritics would have to be introduced. Such a reform would not be too radical. Besides, the advantage of making the Urdu orthography more phonetic, it would also standardise the written form as well as the pronunciation.
The task of promoting Urdu is much broader than that of just making it the official language. It must also become the language of education, science and business. Granted, a huge effort is required. But the fruits will also be rich: not just better administration but also a more cohesive nation, cultural and intellectual flowering of the country and scientific and technological progress. The government’s attitude has so far been a hindrance rather than a help. A radical change of policy and approach will be necessary.
The writer is a former member of the Foreign Service. Email: asifezdi @yahoo.com
US nuclear duplicity-Asif Ezdi
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US nuclear duplicity
Monday, January 25, 2010
Asif Ezdi
The writer is a former member of the Pakistan
Foreign Service
The National Command Authority (NCA) had a well-publicised meeting on Jan 13 against the background of recent statements by India’s army chief Gen Deepak Kapoor that his country is capable of conducting conventional military strikes against Pakistan under a nuclear umbrella, and of fighting both Pakistan and China at the same time. The NCA meeting was also significant because it took place a week before the start of the 2010 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), at which the commencement of negotiations on a treaty on limiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons will be the major issue of discussion.
Kapoor’s statements reflect a dilemma that India has faced since the nuclear tests of 1998. While India established its claim to be a nuclear power, it also forced Pakistan to demonstrate its nuclear capability. The resulting nuclear standoff between the two countries made a resort to conventional warfare an extremely risky venture and had the effect of largely neutralising the advantage in conventional weapons capability that India enjoys over Pakistan. But India is unwilling to accept this reality.
As the reputed US journal Arms Control Today wrote in its issue of July/August 2009, “Indian military planners foolishly believe they can engage in and win a limited conventional conflict without triggering a nuclear exchange, even though the Pakistani army’s strategy relies on nuclear weapons to offset India’s overwhelming conventional superiority.” It is this thinking that lies behind India’s offensive military doctrines like “Cold Start,” and statements such as those made by Kapoor.
These warnings are not only “foolish” but they also become highly dangerous when they come from a senior official of a major foreign power, such as the declaration by US defence secretary Robert Gates last week that if there was a repeat of the Mumbai incident, India should not be expected to show the same restraint that it exercised last time. This statement can only be characterised as highly irresponsible. It is also illogical, because Gates acknowledged that the terrorist threat came from non-state actors outside the control of the Pakistani authorities. Not only that, he also tried to convince the Pakistani leadership in Islamabad that the country did not face any threat on its eastern borders. The defence secretary evidently does not seem to have realised the inherent contradiction between these two stances.
The uneasy peace that the region has enjoyed in recent years rests mainly on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. That is why the proposed Fissile Material Treaty (FMT), which could significantly affect the future nuclear programmes of Pakistan and India, is of such vital interest. The CD broke an 11-year impasse in May last year by agreeing on a work programme for negotiating the treaty. But the commencement of negotiations was held up because of differences over the implementation of the work programme.
Pakistan insisted that progress on the FMT should proceed in tandem with the other core issues before the CD. Largely because of Pakistani objections, the CD could not commence its work on the FMT last year. At the opening session of the CD this year (Jan 19), the Pakistani delegation proposed that the conference should also consider conventional arms control at the regional level and negotiate a global regime on all aspects of missiles. Because of the lack of agreement on this proposal, the adoption of the agenda has been delayed.
Behind these procedural questions, there are important substantive differences. There is no agreement yet on the fundamental question whether the treaty should only prohibit future production or deal also with existing stocks of fissile material. Pakistan has pointed out that freezing the existing asymmetries would undermine its security. The Pakistani delegation has also underlined that for Pakistan the issue is linked to the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), taken in 2008 at US initiative, to allow nuclear trade with India, while continuing the embargo on Pakistan. This deal, as Pakistan has maintained, would enable India to produce substantial additional quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons and consequently upset strategic balance in the region.
The NCA underlined in its press release that during consideration of the FMT by the CD, Pakistan would not accept any discriminatory measures that perpetuate regional instability or are prejudicial to its national security. This is absolutely right. But the question remains whether the procedural tactics being employed by our delegation to stall the work of the CD on the FMT are the best means of achieving our goals. The alternative would be to take part in the negotiations and work for a treaty which is in keeping with our national interests. Failing that, we could withhold our signatures from it.
This is the course India has taken. New Delhi has reservations on halting the production of fissile material and has declared that it will not accept obligations that hinder its nuclear weapons programme. But it has not obstructed negotiations on the treaty.
After the procedural moves made by our delegation in Geneva, Washington and other supporters of the FMT may be expected to make diplomatic demarches urging Islamabad to withdraw its objections to the proposed CD agenda. And if the past is any guide, our Government will not be able to stand up to U.S. pressure.
Our fundamental problem is that our national security policies are largely determined by domestic political considerations. Our response to the India-US nuclear deal is a striking example of this attitude. After it was made public in July 2005, the Musharraf regime made some noises in public expressing its unhappiness but, as Undersecretary of State William J Burns indicated in a meeting with the press in December 2006, Musharraf let it be known privately that he was “not unhappy” with the deal. Musharraf was clearly not prepared to jeopardise US support for his rule.
Musharraf’s policies on this issue have been followed under Zardari – and for the same reasons. He has not taken up the question of Pakistan’s access to civilian nuclear technology in any of his meetings with US leaders. Nor has Gilani or Foreign Minister Qureshi. Also, Nawaz Sharif has not raised it in any of his public speeches or his meetings with visiting leaders from the US administration or Congress. Our “sovereign” parliament has not discussed it either.
In July 2008, several retired ambassadors of Pakistan called upon the government to make civil nuclear cooperation a high-priority issue in our agenda with the United States and other leading NSG members. Later, in September 2009 some former ambassadors wrote in an open letter to Obama that if Pakistan continues to be denied access to civilian nuclear technology on the same terms as India, our partnership with US in the global effort to eradicate terrorism would remain fragile and Pakistan would not be in a position to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the FMT.
Gilani occasionally complains to the media about the double standards of US policy on international civilian nuclear cooperation. He recently brought up this matter with a US congressional delegation. Someone needs to tell him that it is not to the media and US congressmen but the US president and heads of government of other leading NSG countries to whom he should be addressing himself.
In a letter to Zardari last November, Obama offered an expanded strategic partnership to Pakistan. If Gilani is serious, he should now write to the US president to emphasise that if this partnership is to be meaningful, it must include access for Pakistan to civilian nuclear technology. The prime minister should also urge Obama to take the lead in getting Pakistan a waiver from NSG guidelines similar to that given to India. This issue should be made a priority item of the bilateral agenda, starting with the talks being hosted by Hillary Clinton in Washington next month. Gilani should similarly take it up with other leading NSG members.
The writer is a former member of the Foreign Service. Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
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