Archive for June 26th, 2009
Labels by Fasi Zaka
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June 26th by Fasi Zaka.
A label is a powerful tool, pushed on to you by someone else, condemning one to argue, defending oneself rather than explaining personal motivations without prejudice. Labels create the parameters of debate, artificially skewing whatever is being discussed into ad hominem defences rather than free discourse.
A breakaway commander recently labelled Baitullah Mehsud a CIA agent. That he did so in the face of a major Army operation doesn’t really bode well on the basis of purity of intentions. It’s interesting that rather than absolutely condemn what Baitullah stands for, which can be easily morally denounced, the crutch of connotation and allegation was used. In doing so the methods that stand counter to human values gain respite because they are not addressed directly and unequivocally.
This myopia is partly explained by the lack of tradition in respecting differences. Rather than question ideological moorings, we treat it as inexplicable and push the belief that individuals who believe otherwise are infantile and controlled by others. That’s why you have a Zaid Hamid convinced of Hamid Mir being, well, CIA again. Whether Hamid Mir is right or wrong for beliefs introspectively gained, one can at least credit him with being someone who makes up his own mind rather than taking dictation. Versions of this abound for the Talat Hussains, Nadeem Parachas and the Najam Sethis of this world too. For example, the context just changes when it is applied to the Urdu press; there the preferred label becomes Ahmadi influence. These are but just a few examples.
It’s understandable when the less educated hold these views, but in general the same methodology is also at work in the intelligentsia, rather alarmingly so. Unfortunately, these labels tend to acquire Omni-explanatory powers that suppress further discussion because the label is not just a descriptor, but actually a judgment.
When I wrote a recent article called the Tebbit Taliban Test that had a rather broad spectrum of questions on positions of the major parties on the Taliban (directly or indirectly), I got responses from the media wings of the MQM and the Tehrik-e-Insaaf. The MQM’s was rational, and sent across documents to explain what their actual position on the IDPs was. Some of it I agreed with (such as the eventual need for registrations and their donations to the cause), but still remain skeptical based on the manner in which they inflamed feelings, either intentionally or unintentionally.
The Tehrik-e-Insaaf sent a mildly amusing, and greatly overenthusiastic letter to The News, to which I will come later. I do agree that Imran Khan has been a victim of a label, the eminently catchy and sound-bite-friendly term “Taliban Apologist.” It gets tricky from here on, because the issue is no longer just about Imran Khan but also many other people (some in the media) who fall into this lot, whether fairly or unfairly.
Positions that appear to defend the Taliban come from two major categories, the right and the left. The left wants to understand what causes extremism, and indirectly condones it by finding an explanation that creates cause and effect, almost legitimising it. The right sees the Taliban as an expression of archaic purity that divorces itself from the influence of the west entirely in a form of perverse revivalism. Even though both would not normally agree with one another, they come to the defence of the Taliban.
Imran Khan’s position is, of course, a mix of both the left and the right. From the left he borrows the lambasting of the failure in governance and justice (on which he is correct), and from the right the desire to have a Nizam-e-Adl of Sufi Mohammad that mirrors his ethno-nationalism and admiration for Jirgas.
But the reason he has been slandered (as he believes) is not because of the composition of his stance, but simply because he was willing to extend many more chances to the Taliban for their intransigence than others. But if he says he is not with the Taliban in sympathy, we should take his word for it because at least within the current lot of politicians his integrity is not in doubt, even if his platform and ideas seriously are. Calling him a Taliban Sympathiser obviates whatever else is meaningful in his stance, whatever that may be. But coming back to the letter to The News from the PTI. It made one major mistake. Outside the poorly worded sarcasm mentioning the book “How To Lie With Statistics,” it alleged that those who support the Army operation against the Taliban endorsed Zionist methods because it displaced people and controlled territory.
There are obvious errors in the analogy, but there is more to it. Maybe the reference to the Zionism of the Army was the fault of an unthinking office-bearer of the PTI, but similar mentions have also been made by others in the media.
There is a lot to fault the top brass of the Army, such as the dictatorships and the covert misadventures in our neighbourhood, including a reluctance to do something about the militants prior to the current operation because of the insufferable idea of strategic depth. But to call what they are doing now as Zionist is blatantly unfair. Soldiers don’t want to fight their own people, but are doing so to stop the cancer of barbarism. Every life lost sheds blood so all of us, including those displaced, can hopefully live with dignity and protection from arbitrary and cruel “justice,” from bombs that hit mosques in some inexplicable defence of the Taliban’s form of religion.
Maybe most of the refugees from Swat and other areas will tell us today that they preferred living in their homes under the Taliban than a poorly-provided-for camp. It’s a sad day for Pakistan that such a question can be asked. I would be hard pressed to face them and explain why I support the operation. We should have never been in this position, it’s a failure of governance, both civilian and military, and the only reason action is being taken now is so the fruits of the failure don’t grow elsewhere. It’s an ugly situation with no black and white.
The refugees are our burden to bear as a country, and, ID cards or not, the provinces need to show willingness to extend them everything they can. When Pakistan was created we didn’t wait for a NADRA to get its act together before taking in those coming from India. And the soldiers fighting in the troubled areas are no Zionists. They are heroes.
8 Lakh Mereba KiloMeter… by Javaid Choudry
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LUMS Ka Afsosnaak… by Irshad Ahmed Haqani
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Mutasreen Key… by Akraam Sehgal
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CIA Ki Tareekh… by Nazir Leghari
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America Mien… by Agha Masood Hussain
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The eleven indispensables by Nasim Zehra
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With the Army now having demonstrated its will and ability to inflict military damage on armed insurgent groups, specifically in parts of Malakand and FATA, Pakistan will now be involved in a relatively prolonged counterinsurgency effort. While Pakistan-based sleepers and active allies of insurgents join with externally based ones, sections of Pakistan’s forces will have to remain engaged in battling these groups. This would include regular fighting groups, Special Forces and various elements within the intelligence agencies. However, the initial indicators are that both numerically and in scale the insurgency threat is neither chronic, nor deep-rooted enough to turn into a long drawn out affair. Yet, factors like the terrain, weapons availability, its sporadic spread across the country and its ability to potentially win the hearts and minds of the people means that it’s not a quick-win affair.
However, the speed with which this the military operations will terminate and the ability of the counterinsurgency to disable and delegitimise the militants on a long-term basis will not only depend on the military issue. The military is only one, though essential dimension. Also the causes of what Pakistan eventually faced, a national and regional insurgency, emanated from multiple sources. All those sources will have to be blocked, and simultaneously, to ensure a successful counterinsurgency effort. Of the numerous contributing factors the following 11 are noteworthy and require Pakistan to take action:
One, beginning with support to the internally displaced persons, therefore the immediate fallout of the counterinsurgency effort to sustained and focused effort on reconstruction and rehabilitation of the IDPs as they begin their homeward journey, are high-priority moves that the government must make.
Two, the government must ensure that especially military actions and reconstruction-related actions are kept transparent for the public. Three, communication with the people on the counterinsurgency goals, actions, and achievements including timelines must be kept realistic and regular. For example, if the government prematurely announces the end of military operations in any area, as was done in the case of Swat, it will prove counterproductive. Depleting trust and perception of army’s ineffectiveness in its own field of performance will be the outcome.
Three, the government must make no offer for talks to the gun-totting militants. The government’s position that the militants “have to surrender to the writ of the state in accordance with laws…that we have no other option but to win this war,” is a correct position.
Four, the insurgency acquired a scale and complexity also because of Pakistan’s other aggravated situations, including Balochistan. Simultaneous and substantive moves are required by the government to resolve other crises that have proved to be important contributing factors in the insurgency.
Five, the government needs to move on “opening the hearts and minds” of our own people who fell prey to the insurgents’ indoctrination, ironically co-authored initially by sections of some state institutions. Indoctrination through state-sponsored and private madrasas were also a principle contributing factor for these people to falling prey to the insurgents. That too must be altered.
Six, the state’s failure to provide people their constitutional rights was an important factor that won the insurgency some support, but indeed the defining factor was the state’s own security strategy which it initially co-authored in the eighties with the US and other players. Policy reorientation too is required to prevent through another round of state-sponsorship the resurgence of such militant groups.
Seven, the two important yet weak institutional links required for effective good governance are the local administration machinery and the law enforcement agencies. These require immediate strengthening.
Eight, alongside the practical steps taken on the civil and military fronts, a clearly articulated political message needs to be conveyed to the public, by all political leaders, reiteratively. This message, spelling out the concrete steps the government intends to give to the people the promise of a homeland that the Quaid had planned, would help create the political and emotional stamina in the public that maybe required to face the negative costs of a long drawn out counterinsurgency. A united message needs to be given to prepare the public for also the dangers that may still lie ahead. Such a message should be a unifying message coming from all political leaders.
Nine, given the genesis of the insurgency that Pakistan is now trying to defeat and debilitate, government’s clearly articulated commitment to constitutional democracy and constitutionally parliamentary national security policy, is necessary. Indeed, public rejection of any attempt to opt for extra-constitutional or extra-parliamentary policy, even in the name of national interest, must be rejected.
Ten, it must remain clear that Pakistan will through legitimate means pursue its its national security and foreign policy interests within the regional and international context. This would include commitment to a resolution of Kashmir, to a democratic, not dictatorial, expansion of the United Nations Security Council, the international community’s acceptance of Pakistan as a nuclear power, availability of nuclear energy to Pakistan, firming up of Pakistan’s borders, including the Durand Line.
Eleven, given that the insurgency has thrived within the context of unresolved regional issues on the one hand and unresolved principles of inter-state relations on the other. Clearly to successfully battle cross-border a visionary approach requires opting for collective regional security frameworks. Pakistan should lead the move in the region for collective security.
At the core of any successful counterinsurgency effort must be factors that constitute the content of regime legitimacy. Insurgencies are always born within a de-legitimatised socio-political context to unseat incumbent authority. They typically thrive on regime hatred, people’s support for the incumbency, tightly woven organisation, regular supply of weapons and guerrilla warfare tactics. Pakistan’s insurgency was, however, unique in both its inception and evolution. If the current insurgency was to be traced back to the eighties it was indeed created by the state itself, it was politically and financially underwritten by the international community, it was viewed as a security asset, its militant-cum-religious ideological moorings were largely state-authored and internationally supported, multiple state players regionally and globally mobilised foot-soldiers for this insurgency.
Hence, what for want of a more appropriate label is referred to as an insurgency is actually a mini-war machine that the state and its internal and external allies put together. The mini-war machine did eventually acquire its own regional and international persona, its own autonomy and operated as a fragmented entity combining a fiend’s persona with that of a Robin Hood’s. If it captured hearts and minds it also spread terror in people’s hearts. The rollback of this entity therefore required both counterinsurgency elements but also an ideological and political reorientation of the state itself. Unless the state and the governments remain committed to exercise of state and government authority strictly within the context of the parameters laid down with the Constitution this early signs of success in counterinsurgency may not translate into sustained and national-level success.
Zewaal Aye Tu… by Hassan Nisar
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Behes Beray-e-Behes by Abbas Ather
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Methey Kherbozon… by Hamid Mir
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